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WoRKMBN's COMPENSATION-TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS WITHOUT PHYSICAL

INJURY-Appellee and his co-worker attempted to lower a suspended scaffold
• on which they were standing, whereupon the scaffold gave way and the coworker fell to his death. Appellee suffered only slight bruises on his leg, but
as a result of seeing his fellow employee fall to his death, he sustained severe
fright and shock which resulted in a traumatic neurosis preventing him from
engaging in the normal duties of his occupation. The lower court awarded
appellee judgment for permanent partial disability under the Texas Workmen's
Compensation Law.1 On appeal, held, reversed. Appellee's condition was a
mental disease and compensable under Texas law only if it resulted from a
compensable physical injury. American General Ins. Co. v. Bailey, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954) 268 S.W. (2d) 528.
Mental injuries sustained by accident and in the course of employment are
compensable under most workmen's compensation statutes even though arising
solely from fright and shock, and without previous or accompanying physical
injury.2 The broad objective of workmen's compensation laws is to compensate

1 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1941) art. 8306 et seq.
2109 A.L.R. 892 (1937). See especially Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485,
187 N.W. 400 (1922) (death from shock due to accidentally causing fellow employee's
death); Moray v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 1023 (1921) (loss
of vision from hysteria caused by sight of electric flash); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood,
177 Va. 204, 13 S.E. (2d) 291 (1941) (neurosis due to shock of electric flash and shotlike sound); Hunter v. St. Mary's Natural Gas Co., 122 Pa. Super. 300, 186 A. 325 (1936)
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workers for injuries arising from the increased risks of modern industrial society.
Such objectives, consequently, cannot be effectively carried out if legislatures
and courts insist on differentiating between physical and mental injuries in
determining compensability. The Texas statute, by virtue of its peculiar
language,8 has led the courts of that state to develop just such a distinction.
Historically the courts have been reluctant to give legal recognition to mental
injuries unaccompanied by "physical" damage,4 and have devised the familiar
impact doctrine in negligence cases. The reasons underlying such a feeling were
twofold. First, the courts were apprehensive of the difficulty of measuring
mental damages; second, they feared the possibility of fraudulent claims. In
answer, it has often been pointed out that the "physical" pain of a fractured
arm, although equally as difficult to measure as mental pain, has long since been
recognized as an element of damages.5 The fear of opening the Hoodgates to
trivial and fraudulent claims is a real one, but it is not sufficient reason for
denying recovery for genuine and serious mental injury.
In the principal case, two findings by the court were crucial to its holding
that the injury was not compensable under the Texas statute. First, the court
had to, and did, determine that appellee's injury was a disease and not an injury
as defined under the statute. 6 As an injury, appellee's claim would have been
compensable since all other requirements were present.7 The term "injury," as
defined in the Texas statute, has been held to mean damage or harm to the
physical structure of the claimant's body, as distinguished from functional injuries which ostensibly affect only the bodily processes.8 Medical testimony
describing appellee's condition as a mental disturbance or nervous illness led the
court to characterize the injury as functional and thus not an injury under the
statute. Assuming, as this court did, that the neurosis was not itself an injury,
but was a disease, the court must then find that it did not naturally result from
appellee's minor physical injuries. Such a finding was made. However, there
is considerable doubt as to the court's decision that claimant's injury was not a
personal injury per se under the statute. It is believed that a traumatic neurosis,

(dog jumping on decedent's back caused death from fright without physical injury); Yates
v. South Kirkby, Featherstone & Kemsworth Collieries, Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 538 (shock
due to sight of injured fellow employee).
8 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1941) art. 8309, §1: ''The tenns 'injury' or 'personal
injury' shall be construed to mean damage or harm to the physical structure of the body
and such diseases or infection as naturally result therefrom."
4 For a full treatment of this area, see Prosser, "Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort," 37 M:rCH. L. REv. 874 (1939).
5 McCoRMicx, DAMAGES 315-316 (1935).
6 See note 3 supra.
7Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1941) art. 8306, §3b merely requires that the employee sustain an injury in the course of his employment.
.
s Southern Cas. Co. v. Flores, (Tex. Com. App. 1928) 1 S.W. (2d) 260; Fidelity
Union Cas. Co. v. Martin, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 45 S.W. (2d) 682; Safety Cas. Co.
v. Walls, (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 117 S.W. (2d) 879.
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such as the appellee suffered, is in fact a physical injury and not solely a state of
mind, for fright affects the physical organism as definitely and as harmfully as
a blow on the body. The physical effects of fright and shock have been demonstrated to include deterioration of body cells, increased thyroid secretion, accelerated circulation, increased respiration and body temperature, altered metabolism, and decreased digestion.9 The nervous system is a distinct part of the
physical body, and if it is affected by fright to such an extent as to cause damage
to the body or its processes, such an injury is in fact physical. It is common
medical knowledge today that a sound body is never found with an injured
nervous system. By strictly interpreting the statutory language and by ignoring
medical knowledge, Texas courts have extended the anomalous impact doctrine
to workmen's compensation cases.10 As stated above, such results stem from a
genuine fear of "compensation neurosis" claims.11 However, even this latter
type of neurosis, if bona fide and causally related to an accident arising out of
and in the course of employment, should be compensated. If the neurosis is in
fact fraudulent or non-existent, such facts can be discovered by competent
medical observation. The difficulties involved in detecting and measuring bona
fide "mental" injuries should not lead the courts to decisions which in effect
defeat part of the remedial objectives of this legislation.

Irving L. Halpern
9 See Goodrich, ''Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage," 20 M:rcH. L. R:sv. 497
(1922).
10 See Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W. (2d) 345 (1948),
where compensation was allowed for neurosis related to a minor foot injury.
11 The courts have used this term to denote a genuine neurosis arising from an unconscious desire for compensation and anxiety over pending claims.

